Displaying episodes 1 - 30 of 164 in total

Case: Kahler v. Kansas (10/07/19)

QUESTION PRESENTED:  Do the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments permit a state to abolish the insanity defense? Transcript to Argument: https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2019/18-6135_5h26.pdf --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/scotus/support

Case: Peter v. NantKwest, Inc. (10/07/19)

QUESTION PRESENTED:  When the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) denies a patent application, the Patent Act gives the unsuccessful applicant two avenues for seeking judicial review of the agency's decision. The applicant may appeal directly to the Federal Circuit, 35 U.S.C. 141, which "shall review the decision from which an appeal is taken on the record before the [USPTO],” 35 U.S.C. 144. Alternatively, the applicant may bring a civil action against the Director of the USPTO in district court, where the applicant may present additional evidence. 35 U.S.C. 145. If the applicant elects to bring such an action, "[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings shall be paid by the applicant." Ibid. The question presented is as follows:  Whether the phrase "[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings" in 35 U.S.C. 145 encompasses the personnel expenses the USPTO incurs when its employees, including attorneys, defend the agency in Section 145 litigation. Argument Transcript: https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2019/18-801_7kh7.pdf --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/scotus/support

Case: Ramos v. Louisiana (10/07/19)

QUESTION PRESENTED:  Whether the Fourteenth Amendment fully incorporates the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a unanimous verdict? THE MOTION OF PETITIONER FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IS GRANTED, AND G. BEN COHEN, ESQ., OF NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, IS APPOINTED TO SERVE AS COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER IN THIS CASE. Argument Transcript: https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2019/18-5924_4gcj.pdf --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/scotus/support

Case: Bostock v. Clayton County (10/08/19)

QUESTION PRESENTED:  Whether discrimination against an employee because of sexual orientation constitutes prohibited employment discrimination "because of... sex" within the meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42U.S.C. § 2000e-2. CONSOLIDATED WITH 17-1623 FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT. Argument Transcript: https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2019/17-1618_7k47.pdf --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/scotus/support

Case: R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. EEOC (10/08/19)

QUESTION PRESENTED:  Whether the word "sex" in Title VII's prohibition on discrimination "because of ... sex," 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(l), meant "gender identity" and included "transgender status" when Congress enacted Title VII in 1964.  Whether Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), prohibits employers from applying sex-specific policies according to their employees' sex rather than their gender identity. GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER TITLE VII PROHIBITS DISCRIMINATION AGAINST TRANSGENDER PEOPLE BASED ON (1) THEIR STATUS AS TRANSGENDER OR (2) SEX STEREOTYPING UNDER PRICE WATERHOUSE v. HOPKINS, 490 U. S. 228 (1989). Argument Transcript: https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2019/18-107_c18e.pdf --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/scotus/support

Case: 18-1334 Financial Oversight and Management Bd. for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Investment, LLC (2019-10-15)

QUESTION PRESENTED: Whether the Appointments Clause governs the appointment of members of the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico. CONSOLIDATED WITH 18-1475, 18-1496, 18-1514 AND 18-1521, AND WILL BE SET FOR ARGUMENT IN THE SECOND WEEK OF THE OCTOBER 2019 ARGUMENT SESSION. Argument Transcript: https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2019/18-1334_dc8f.pdf --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/scotus/support

Case: 17-834 Kansas v. Garcia (2019-10-16)

QUESTION PRESENTED: In 1986, Congress enacted the Immigration Reform and Control Act CIRCA (IRCA). IRCA made it illegal to employ unauthorized aliens, established an employment eligibility verification system, and created various civil and criminal penalties against employers who violate the law. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a. Regulations implementing IRCA created a "Form I-9" that employers are required to have all prospective employees complete-citizens and aliens alike.  IRCA contains an "express preemption provision, which in most instances bars States from imposing penalties on employers of unauthorized aliens," Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 406 (2012), but IRCA "is silent about whether additional penalties may be imposed against the employees themselves." Id. IRCA also provides that "[the Form I-9] and any information contained in or appended to such form, may not be used for purposes other than enforcement of [chapter 12 of Title 8] and sections 1001, 1028, 1546, and 1621 of Title 18." 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(5).  Here, Respondents used other peoples' social security numbers to complete documents, including a Form I-9, a federal W-4 tax form, a state K-4 tax form, and an apartment lease. Kansas prosecuted Respondents for identity theft and making false writings without using the Form I-9, but the Kansas Supreme Court held that IRCA expressly barred these state prosecutions. This petition presents two questions, depending on the answer to the first question:  Whether IRCA expressly preempts the States from using any information entered on or appended to a federal Form I-9, including common information such as name, date of birth, and social security number, in a prosecution of any person (citizen or alien) when that same, commonly used information also appears in non-IRCA documents, such as state tax forms, leases, and credit applications. If IRCA bars the States from using all such information for any purpose, whether Congress has the constitutional power to so broadly preempt the States from exercising their traditional police powers to prosecute state law crimes. Argument Transcript: https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2019/17-834_jifl.pdf --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/scotus/support

Case: 18-328 Rotkiske v. Klemm (2019-10-16)

QUESTION PRESENTED: Whether the "discovery rule" applies to toll the one (1) year statute of limitations under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692, et seq., as the Fourth and Ninth Circuits have held but the Third Circuit (sua sponte en banc) has held contrarily. Argument Transcript: https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2019/18-328_l6gn.pdf --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/scotus/support

Case: 18-217 Mathena v. Malvo (2019-10-16)

QUESTION PRESENTED: In Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), this Court held that "mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on 'cruel and unusual punishments.'" Id. at 465. Four years later, in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016), the Court held that "Miller announced a substantive rule of constitutional law" that, under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), must be given "retroactive effect" in cases where direct review was complete when Miller was decided. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736.  The question presented is:  Did the Fourth Circuit err in concluding-in direct conflict with Virginia's highest court and other courts-that a decision of this Court (Montgomery) addressing whether a new constitutional rule announced in an earlier decision (Miller) applies retroactively on collateral review may properly be interpreted as modifying and substantively expanding the very rule whose retroactivity was in question? Argument Transcript: https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2019/18-217_k5fl.pdf --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/scotus/support

Case: 18-725 - Barton v. Barr (2019-Nov-04)

QUESTION PRESENTED: Whether a lawfully admitted permanent resident who is not seeking admission to the United States can be "render[ed] ... inadmissible" for the purposes of the stop-time rule, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(l). https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2019/18-725_g314.pdf --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/scotus/support

Case: 18-260 County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund (2019-Nov-06)

QUESTION PRESENTED: In the Clean Water Act (CWA), Congress differentiated between point source and nonpoint source pollution in controlling pollution of navigable waters. The CWA regulates point source pollution through permits, while nonpoint source pollution is controlled through federal oversight of state management programs and other non-CWA programs.  This Court and several courts of appeals have read the CWA's line dividing point source and nonpoint source pollution to turn on whether pollutants are delivered to navigable waters by a point source.  Parting with those cases, the Ninth Circuit concluded that point source pollution also includes pollutants that reach navigable waters by nonpoint sources so long as the pollutants can be "traced" in more than "de minimis" amounts to a point source. This holding expands CWA permitting to millions of sources previously regulated as nonpoint source pollution. The questions presented are:  Whether the CWA requires a permit when pollutants originate from a point source but are conveyed to navigable waters by a nonpoint source, such as groundwater.  Whether the County of Maui had fair notice that a CWA permit was required for its underground injection control wells that operated without such a permit for nearly 40 years. https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2019/18-260_8mjp.pdf --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/scotus/support

Case: 18-877 - Allen v. Cooper (2019-Nov-05)

QUESTION PRESENTED: Whether Congress validly abrogated state sovereign immunity via the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 101-553, 104 Stat. 2749 (1990), in providing remedies for authors of original expression whose federal copyrights are infringed by States. https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2019/18-877_6jfm.pdf --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/scotus/support

Case: 18-565 - CITGO Asphalt Refining Co. v. Frescati Shipping Co. (2019-Nov-05)

QUESTION PRESENTED: Whether under federal maritime law a safe berth clause in a voyage charter contract is a guarantee of a ship's safety, as the Third Circuit below and the Second Circuit have held, or a duty of due diligence, as the Fifth Circuit has held. https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2019/18-565_aplc.pdf --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/scotus/support

Case: 18-556 - Kansas v. Glover (2019-Nov-04)

QUESTION PRESENTED: A Kansas officer ran a registration check on a pickup truck and learned that the registered owner's license had been revoked. Suspecting that the owner was unlawfully driving, the officer stopped the truck, confirmed that the owner was driving, and issued the owner a citation for being a habitual violator of Kansas traffic laws. The Kansas Supreme Court, breaking with 12 state supreme courts and 4 federal circuits, held the stop violated the Fourth Amendment.  The question presented is whether, for purposes of an investigative stop under the Fourth Amendment, it is reasonable for an officer to suspect that the registered owner of a vehicle is the one driving the vehicle absent any information to the contrary. https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2019/18-556_bqmd.pdf --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/scotus/support

Case: 18-1165 - Retirement Plans Comm. of IBM v. Jander (2019-Nov-06)

QUESTION PRESENTED: In Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, this Court unanimously held that to state a claim under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA''), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., for breach of the fiduciary duty of prudence based on inside information, a plaintiff must "plausibly allege[] that a prudent fiduciary in the defendant's position could not have concluded that [an alternative action] would do more harm than good to the fund." 573 U.S. 409, 429-30 (2014); accord Amgen Inc. v. Harris, 136 S. Ct. 758 (2016). The Court designed this "context specific" standard to deter the kind of meritless suits lower courts had eliminated through a presumption of prudence (which the Court rejected) and to "readily divide the plausible sheep from the meritless goats" at the pleading stage. 573 U.S. at 425. In the decision below, the Court of Appeals subverted that pleading standard and opened a circuit split by relying on boilerplate allegations that the harm of an eventual disclosure of an alleged fraud typically increases the longer the fraud continues. Those allegations "always" can be, and routinely are, pleaded in support of a Fifth Third claim. Other courts of appeals have rejected the same allegations as insufficient as a matter of law, in order to avoid undermining the pleading standard imposed by Fifth Third and Amgen and to deter meritless ERISA suits.  The question presented is: Whether Fifth Third's "more harm than good" pleading standard can be satisfied by generalized allegations that the harm of an inevitable disclosure of an alleged fraud generally increases over time. --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/scotus/support

Case: 18-587 Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. (2019-Nov-12)

QUESTION PRESENTED: This dispute concerns the policy of immigration enforcement discretion known as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA). In 2016, this Court affirmed, by an equally divided Court, a decision of the Fifth Circuit holding that two related Department of Homeland Security (DHS) discretionary enforcement policies, including an expansion of the DACA policy, were likely unlawful and should be enjoined. See United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (per curiam). In September 2017, DHS determined that the original DACA policy was unlawful and would likely be struck down by the courts on the same grounds as the related policies. DHS thus instituted an orderly wind-down of the DACA policy.  The questions presented are as follows: Whether DHS's decision to wind down the DACA policy is judicially reviewable Whether DHS's decision to wind down the DACA policy is lawful. Argument Transcript: https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2019/18-587_1bn2.pdf --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/scotus/support

Case: 17-1678 Hernández v. Mesa (2019-Nov-12)

QUESTION PRESENTED: Whether, when plaintiffs plausibly allege that a rogue federal law enforcement officer violated clearly established Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights for which there is no alternative legal remedy, the federal courts can and should recognize a damages claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)? If not, whether the Westfall Act violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment insofar as it preempts state-law tort suits for damages against rogue federal law enforcement officers acting within the scope of their employment for which there is no alternative legal remedy. Argument Transcript: https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2019/17-1678_21p3.pdf --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/scotus/support

Case: 18-1171 Comcast Corp. v. National Ass. of African American-Owned Media (2019-Nov-13)

QUESTION PRESENTED: Entertainment Studios Networks ("ESN") owns several television networks that it sought to have carried on Comcast's cable system. Comcast and ESN met multiple times to discuss a potential deal, but Comcast ultimately declined to carry ESN's networks. ESN's response was to sue Comcast, claiming that Comcast's decision was based on an outlandish racist conspiracy between Comcast, the NAACP, and other civilrights groups and leaders to disadvantage wholly African American-owned networks in violation of 42U.S.C. § 1981.  The district court dismissed ESN's complaint three times, but the Ninth Circuit reversed. The court first ruled that Section 1981 does not require but-for causation, thereby exacerbating a conflict with the decisions of five other courts of appeals. It then held that ESN's claim was plausible despite the alternative explanations for Comcast's conduct on the face of the complaint, and the complaint's failure to allege facts showing that the other companies with which Comcast contracted were similarly situated to ESN. The questions presented are:  Does a claim of race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 fail in the absence of but-for causation?  Can a plaintiff state a plausible claim for relief if the complaint does not allege facts tending to exclude obvious alternative explanations for the challenged conduct and does not allege facts to support all elements of the claim? Argument Transcript:  https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2019/18-1171_ljgm.pdf --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/scotus/support

Case: 18-938 Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC (2019-Nov-13)

QUESTION PRESENTED: Whether an order denying a motion for relief from the automatic stay is a final order under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1). In diverting from this Court's prior precedent, and in conflict with the First and Third Circuit Courts of Appeal, the Sixth Circuit ruled that an order denying relief from the automatic stay is per se final. Argument Transcript: https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2019/18-938_k536.pdf --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/scotus/support

Case: 18-280 New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. City of New York (2019-Dec-02)

PRESENTED QUESTION: New York City prohibits its residents from possessing a handgun without a license, and the only license the City makes available to most residents allows its holder to possess her handgun only in her home or en route to one of seven shooting ranges within the city. The City thus bans its residents from transporting a handgun to any place outside city limits-even if the handgun is unloaded and locked in a container separate from its ammunition, and even if the owner seeks to transport it only to a second home for the core constitutionally protected purpose of self-defense, or to a more convenient out-of-city shooting range to hone its safe and effective use. The City asserts that its transport ban promotes public safety by limiting the presence of handguns on city streets. But the City put forth no empirical evidence that transporting an unloaded handgun, locked in a container separate from its ammunition, poses a meaningful risk to public safety. Moreover, even if there were such a risk, the City's restriction poses greater safety risks by encouraging residents who are leaving town to leave their handguns behind in vacant homes, and it serves only to increase the frequency of handgun transport within city limits by forcing many residents to use an incity range rather than more convenient ranges elsewhere. The question presented is:  Whether the City's ban on transporting a licensed, locked, and unloaded handgun to a home or shooting range outside city limits is consistent with the Second Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and the constitutional right to travel. --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/scotus/support

Case: 18-1150 Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc.(2019-Dec-02)

QUESTION PRESENTED: This Court has held, as a matter of "public policy," that judicial opinions are not copyrightable. Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 253-254 (1888). Lower courts have extended that holding to state statutes. See, e.g., John G. Danielson, Inc. v. Winchester-Conant Props., Inc., 322 F.3d 26, 38 (1st Cir. 2003). But the rule that "government edicts” cannot be copyrighted has "proven difficult to apply when the material in question does not fall neatly into the categories of statutes or judicial opinions." Ibid. The question presented is: Whether the government edicts doctrine extends to-and thus renders uncopyrightable-works that lack the force of law, such as the annotations in the Official Code of Georgia Annotated. --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/scotus/support

Case: 18-1269 Rodriguez v. FDIC (2019-Dec-03)

QUESTION PRESENTED: The Internal Revenue Code permits affiliated corporate groups-consisting of a parent corporation and its subsidiaries-to file a consolidated income tax return. 26 U.S.C. §§ 1501, 1504(a). When the Internal Revenue Service issues a tax refund to an affiliated group, that refund is made "directly to and in the name of” the parent corporation, even if the refund arises in whole or in part from the losses of a corporate subsidiary. 26 C.F.R. § 1.1502-77(c), (d)(5). Three Circuits, including the court below, have adopted a federal common law rule known as the "Bob Richards rule," under which a tax refund paid to an affiliated group is presumed to belong to the corporate subsidiary whose losses gave rise to the refund unless the parties clearly agree otherwise. Four Circuits reject that rule, and instead determine ownership of a tax refund based on applicable state law. The question presented is:  Whether courts should determine ownership of a tax refund paid to an affiliated group based on the federal common law "Bob Richards rule," as three Circuits hold, or based on the law of the relevant State, as four Circuits hold. --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/scotus/support

Case: 17-1498 Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Christian (2019-Dec-03)

QUESTION PRESENTED: In a divided decision that conflicts with decisions of federal courts of appeals nationwide, the Supreme Court of Montana held that landowners can pursue common-law claims for "restoration" requiring environmental cleanups at Superfund sites that directly conflict with EPA-ordered cleanups at these sites. The Montana court reached that result for one of the largest, oldest, and most expensive Superfund sites in the country, the Anaconda Smelter site. The court ignored EPA's views that the Superfund statute-the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)-barred the restoration claims and that plaintiffs' preferred remedies would hurt the environment. The state court's holding throws remediation efforts at Anaconda and other massive sites into chaos and opens the door for thousands of private individuals to select and impose their own remedies at CERCLA sites at a potential cost of many millions of dollars per site. The questions presented are: Whether a common-law claim for restoration seeking cleanup remedies that conflict with EPA-ordered remedies is a "challenge" to EPA's cleanup jurisdictionally barred by § 113 of CERCLA.  Whether a landowner at a Superfund site is a "potentially responsible party" that must seek EPA's approval under CERCLA § 122(e)(6) before engaging in remedial action, even if EPA has never ordered the landowner to pay for a cleanup.  Whether CERCLA preempts state common-law claims for restoration that seek cleanup remedies that conflict with EPA-ordered remedies. --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/scotus/support

Case: 18-1116 Intel Corp. Investment Policy Comm. v. Sulyma (2019-Dec-04)

QUESTION PRESENTED: Whether the three-year limitations period in Section 413(2) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1113(2), which runs from "the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach or violation," bars suit where all of the relevant information was disclosed to the plaintiff by the defendants more than three years before the plaintiff filed the complaint, but the plaintiff chose not to read or could not recall having read the information. --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/scotus/support

Case: 18-6943 Banister v. Davis (2019-Dec-04)

QUESTION PRESENTED: Question One: In Gonzalez V. Crosby this Court held that a Rule 60(b) motion that either adds new habeas claim or attacks the court's previous resolution of the habeas claims, should be treated as a successive habeas petition under AEDPA's §2244. Does Gonzalez extend to post-judgment motions filed under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure? a. If so, should a timely filed Rule 59(e) motion toll the the time to file a notice of appeal under Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 4(a)(4)(A)(iv)? Question Two: Whether a pro se petitioner must be warned and given an opportunity to withdraw a post-judgment motion which has been recharacterized as a successive habeas petition if that recharacterization will effect his ability to file a timely notice of appeal? Argument Transcript: https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2019/18-6943_bq7c.pdf --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/scotus/support

Case: 18-776 Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr and 18-1015 OVALLES V. BARR (2019-DEC-09)

QUESTION PRESENTED: 18-776 The deadline to file a statutory motion to reopen under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) is subject to equitable tolling; all the courts of appeals are in agreement. But they are in conflict as to whether they have jurisdiction to review an agency's denial of a request for equitable tolling made by someone subject to the "criminal alien bar" pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C).  The Fifth and Fourth circuit say review of equitable tolling is a "question of fact" precluded from review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). In contrast, the Ninth circuit says equitable tolling is a "mixed question," i.e., "a question of law," which falls under the jurisdictional savings clause under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D ).  Therefore, the question presented is:  Is a request for equitable tolling, as it applies to statutory motions to reopen, judicially reviewable as a "question of law?" 18-1015 Following this Court's judgment in Mata v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 2150 (2015), the Fifth Circuit joined all of its sister circuits in holding that the statutory deadline for filing a motion to reopen a removal order is subject to equitable tolling. Lugo-Resendez v. Lynch, 831 F 3d 337 (CA5 2016). In so doing, the Fifth Circuit adopted this Courts standard for equitable tolling from Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 136 S. Ct 750 (2016).  Thereafter, the Fifth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the merits of whether a movant (with criminal removability) pursued their rights diligently, thus further dividing a split between the courts of appeals. Penalva v. Sessions, 884 F 3d 521 (CA5 2018). The question presented here is: Whether the application of a legal standard to an undisputed set of facts is a question of law, or a pure question of fact that may be barred from judicial review. Or, more specifically:  Whether the criminal alien bar, 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(C), tempered by §1252(a)(2)(D), prohibits a court from reviewing an agency decision finding that a movant lacked diligence for equitable tolling purposes, notwithstanding the lack of a factual dispute. --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/scotus/support

Case: 18-916 Thryv, Inc. v. Click-To-Call Technologies, LP (2019-DEC-09)

QUESTION PRESENTED: The America Invents Act created "inter partes review" ("IPR"), an agency procedure for challenging a patent before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board ("PTAB"). The statute has two provisions relevant here, each of which was interpreted by a divided Federal Circuit sitting en banc. First, 35 U.8.C. § 315(b) provides that "[a]n inter partes review may not be instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner ... is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent." Second, § 314(d) provides that "[t]he determination by the Director whether to institute an inter partes review under this section shall be final and nonappealable." In a recent case, the en banc Federal Circuit held (with four dissenters) that, notwithstanding§ 314(d), a PTAB decision to institute an IPR after finding that the § 315(b) time bar did not apply was appealable. The panel applied that ruling in this case. Then, the en banc Federal Circuit, again divided (with two dissenters), held in this case that service of a patent infringement complaint that is later dismissed without prejudice triggers the§ 315(b) time bar. The questions presented are: Whether 35 U.8.C. § 314(d) permits appeal of the PTAB's decision to institute an inter partes review upon finding that§ 315(b)'s time bar did not apply. Whether 35 U.8.C. § 315(b) bars institution of an inter partes review when the previously served patent infringement complaint, filed more than one year before the IPR petition, had been dismissed without prejudice. --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/scotus/support

Case: 18-1023 Maine Community Health Options v. United States (2019-DEC-10)

QUESTION PRESENTED: Given the "cardinal rule" disfavoring implied repeals-which applies with "especial force" to appropriations acts and requires that repeal not be found unless  the later enactment is "irreconcilable" with the former-can an appropriations rider whose text bars the agency's use of certain funds to pay a statutory obligation, but does not repeal or amend the statutory obligation, and is thus not inconsistent with it, nonetheless be held to impliedly repeal the obligation by elevating the perceived "intent" of the rider (drawn from unilluminating legislative history) above its text, and the text of the underlying statute? Where the federal government has an unambiguous statutory payment obligation, under a program involving reciprocal commitments by the government and a private company participating in the program, does the presumption against retroactivity apply to the interpretation of an appropriations rider that is claimed to have impliedly repealed the government's obligation? CONSOLIDATED WITH 18-1028 AND 18-1038, AND A TOTAL OF ONE HOUR IS ALLOTTED FOR ORAL ARGUMENT. --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/scotus/support

Case: 18-7739 Holguin-Hernandez v. United States (2019-DEC-10)

Facts of the case Gonzalo Holguin was convicted for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation of federal law, and sentenced to 24 months in prison, followed by two years of supervised release. Holguin was again arrested for possession and intent to distribute, and after that arrest the government filed a petition to revoke the supervised release term. Before the revocation hearing occurred, Holguin pleaded guilty to the second set of charges. At the revocation hearing, the district court explained the allegations of the revocation petition to Holguin and asked how he pleaded. Holguin answered “True.” Holguin’s attorney argued for a concurrent sentence on the revocation, but the court a 12-month consecutive sentence instead. Holguin appealed the reasonableness of his sentence, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding Holguin had failed to make a formal objection after the announcement of his sentence. QUESTION PRESENTED: Whether a formal objection after pronouncement of sentence is necessary to invoke appellate reasonableness review of the length of a defendant's sentence. --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/scotus/support

Case: 18-935 Monasky v. Taglieri (2019-DEC-11)

QUESTION PRESENTED Michelle Monasky, a U.S. citizen married to Domenico Taglieri, an Italian citizen, claimed that Taglieri had repeatedly assaulted her before and during her pregnancy. Monasky returned to the United States with their two-month-old daughter, and Taglieri asked an Italian court to terminate Monasky’s parental rights. The Italian court ruled in Taglieri’s favor ex parte (without an appearance by Monasky). Taglieri then asked a federal court to require that Monasky return the baby to Italy. The court granted Taglieri’s petition, finding that Italy was the baby’s habitual residence. Both the Sixth Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court denied Monasky’s motion for a stay pending appeal, so Monasky returned their daughter to Italy. A panel of the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, and then the Sixth Circuit agreed to a rehearing en banc. The International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 22 U.S.C. § 9001 et seq. implements the Hague Convention in the United States, and the law defines wrongful removal as taking a child in violation of custodial rights “under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal.” To determine the child’s habitual residence, a court must look “to the place in which the child has become ‘acclimatized,’ or as a back-up inquiry, “shared parental intent.” Because the child, at two months of age, was too young to acclimate to a country, the relevant inquiry is the parents’ shared intent. The district court is in the best position to make such an inquiry, and, finding no clear error in the district court’s finding as to habitual residence, the Sixth Circuit (en banc) affirmed. QUESTIONS: What is the proper standard of review of a district court’s determination of habitual residence under the Hague Convention—de novo, a deferential version of de novo, or for clear error? When an infant is too young to acclimate to her surroundings, is a subjective agreement between the infant‘s parents is necessary to establish her habitual residence under the Hague Convention? --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/scotus/support